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We study the effects of a change in financial aid policy introduced by a Northeastern 
university in 1998.  Prior to that time, the university￿s financial aid packages for low-
income students consisted of grants, loans, and campus jobs.  After the change, the entire 
loan portion of the package for low-income students was replaced with grants.  We find 
the program increased the likelihood of matriculation by low-income students by about 3 
percentage points, although the effect is not statistically significant.  The effect among 
low-income minority students was about twice that size and statistically significant at the 
10 percent level.   
  
I. Introduction 
  In recent decades, the average cost of attending a four-year college has risen 
substantially, from $9,539 in 1988 to $12,282 in 1998 (in 1999 constant dollars) [Digest 
of Education Statistics, 2000]
1.  This increase has engendered concerns that attending 
college is beyond the financial reach of many students.  The public policy response has 
been to introduce or expand a variety of government grant and scholarship programs.
2  At 
the same time, a number of colleges and universities have augmented their own financial 
aid programs in order to attract low-income students.  This can be done in two non-
mutually exclusive ways.  The first is to increase the amount of aid; the second is to alter 
the composition of the aid package, changing the mix of grants, loans, and jobs. 
Although there is a substantial academic literature on the impact of tuition levels 
on enrollment decisions (see, e.g., Manski and Wise [1973], McPherson and Schapiro 
[1991a,b], Kane [1994], and Rouse [1994]), not much research has been done on the 
effects of different types of financial aid on student enrollment.  The key result in the 
literature is that enrollment decisions are, in fact, sensitive to the amount of tuition.   
Further, Kane [1994] finds that the decision to enroll in college is sensitive to both tuition 
and the level of Pell Grants.  The effects are roughly of equal magnitude and opposite 
sign suggesting that net college cost (as opposed to ￿sticker price￿) is the relevant 
variable in the matriculation decision.
3  A smaller literature has attempted to estimate the 
effect of college costs on enrollment at a particular institution.  Hoenack [1971], 
Ehrenberg and Sherman [1984], and Moore, Studenmund and Slobko [1991] each 
                                                 
1 All dollar values in this paper are in 1999 dollars unless otherwise specified. 
2 For example, during the 1990s Congress increased the level of Pell grants, made student loans more 
generous, and introduced college tax credits (Kane [1999]).  In addition, there is growing interest in 
reducing the loan burden of low-income students by such measures as front-loading Pell grants.  2  
 
estimate the probability that a student accepts an offer at a particular school; they find 
that higher net college costs make students less likely to enroll at a particular institution.  
Further, Ehrenberg and Sherman find that the response is largest for minority students, 
middle to upper income students, and more scholastically able students (as measured by 
SAT scores).  These results are also consistent with those of Jackson [1990], who 
separately analyzes the responsiveness to financial aid of black, Hispanic, and white 
students using the High School and Beyond dataset.  He finds that blacks are more 
responsive to financial aid than whites, and that blacks are more responsive to grants than 
to loans. 
A potential problem with many of these papers is that the data lack a source of 
variation in college costs or financial aid composition that is exogenous to student 
characteristics. College financial aid offers often depend on the characteristics of the 
student; students who are considered more desirable by the college administration may 
receive more generous offers.  Hence, college costs and financial aid packages are likely 
correlated with student characteristics.  As a result, in a regression of the attendance 
decision on net college cost, it is difficult to identify the independent effect of college 
cost.  In particular, the coefficient on college cost may partially reflect the impact of 
unobserved characteristics of the student.  In an attempt to address the selection problem, 
van der Klaauw [1996] uses a regression discontinuity approach to estimate that the 
financial aid offer has a significant effect on college enrollment.  Dynarski [1999, 2000] 
uses the end of the Social Security Student Benefits program and the creation of the Hope 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 See also Schwartz [1985] and Savoca [1991].  3  
 
Scholarship in Georgia as exogenous sources of variation and finds, in both cases, 
positive effects of grant aid on student enrollment in college.
 4  
In this paper, we analyze the effect of grant aid on student matriculation at a 
major Northeastern university (hereinafter referred to as ￿NEU￿).  Like most selective 
colleges, NEU administers its own financial aid program, and in this analysis we exploit a 
change in NEU￿s financial aid policy.  Prior to 1998, NEU’s financial aid package to low-
income students included loans, scholarships, and jobs.  Beginning with the class of 2002 
(which entered NEU in September, 1998), the loan component was entirely eliminated 
and replaced with grants.  Because this change in the financial aid policy induced 
systematic variation in the financial aid packages of low-income students that is likely 
uncorrelated with other student characteristics, this exogenous policy variation allows 
more meaningful estimates of the effect of the form of financial aid on college 
enrollment.  We implement a ￿difference-in-differences￿ estimator to study the impact of 
this policy change on the probability that admitted low-income students enroll at NEU.  
Our main finding is that converting loans to grants had no statistically discernible effect 
on the matriculation rate of low-income admits.   However, there was a marginally 
significant positive impact on the likelihood of enrollment among low-income minority 
students. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a description of 
the financial aid program at NEU, both before and after the 1998 change, and outlines our 
                                                 
4 Under the Social Security Student Benefits program, which ended in 1982, 18- to 22-year-old children of 
deceased, disabled or retired Social Security beneficiaries received substantial monthly payments while 
enrolled full-time in college.  Under the Hope Scholarship program, all Georgia residents with at least a B 
average in high school can attend a public college in Georgia for free.  4  
 
econometric model.  Section III describes the data.  Some descriptive statistics and the 
econometric results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Institutional  Background 
In 1998 NEU announced that the loan component of the financial aid packages of 
students would be replaced by grants.  University officials identified two major reasons 
for this change.  The first was to reduce the importance of financial barriers in the 
decision to apply to or attend the school, and the second was to ensure that a recent drop 
in the number of low-income students matriculating did not become a trend.  Officials 
emphasized that this policy was not undertaken to lure students away from other 
institutions, but rather to fulfill NEU￿s commitment to provide adequate financial aid to 
all students.   
When a student applies for aid, NEU first computes his or her ￿demonstrated 
need,￿ which is the difference between the cost of college and NEU’s estimate of the 
student￿s ability to pay based on his or her family￿s financial position. The student 
receives this amount of support in the form of a package that potentially consists of three 
components:  grants, loans, and jobs.  Grant aid includes funds from any source (federal 
Pell grants, university endowment funds, etc.) that are provided without expectation of 
repayment or any work done by the student.  Loans must be repaid with interest, although 
the payments and accrual of interest may be deferred until some time after the student’s 
graduation, and interest is charged at less than market rates.  Job aid consists of a paid 
position at the university, usually made available through the financial aid or a related  5  
 
office.  At NEU, such jobs usually require nine hours of work each week during the 
academic year. 
  These three forms of aid have different costs and values to both the college and 
the student. Jobs are relatively inexpensive for the university because the student 
performs services of value in return for the funds.  Some student jobs are also subsidized 
by the federal work-study program, which pays part of a qualified student’s wages.   
Loans are less expensive than grants for the loan provider, as they are repaid (even 
though the interest rate is usually low and the payments are often deferred for several 
years).  To a student, grants are the most valuable, being essentially ￿free money.￿  In 
contrast, the present discounted value of a dollar of loan aid is only about fifty cents.
5 
Financial aid offers for students admitted NEU are calculated according to the 
following process.  The financial aid staff begins by determining the student￿s family 
contribution (a function of the family￿s financial resources).  If the family￿s calculated 
ability to pay is less than the cost of attending NEU, then the student qualifies for 
financial aid.  In composing the financial aid package, the financial aid staff begins with a 
standard amount of job aid and a base loan amount; grants fill the remaining gap between 
the student￿s ability to pay and the cost of NEU.  The final financial aid package is then 
adjusted by the financial aid staff where deemed appropriate.  Because of this final 
adjustment, there is no straightforward algorithm that exactly determines each student’s 
financial aid package.  
The cost of attending NEU rose from $27,729 in 1988 to $34,171 in 2000, and 
NEU￿s financial aid packages grew along with it.  (All dollar figures in this paper are 
                                                 
5 The precise value, of course, depends on factors such as the particular terms of the loan and the student￿s 
discount rate (McPherson and Schapiro [1991b], Feldstein [1992]).  6  
 
expressed in 1999 dollars unless otherwise specified).  In 1988, the standard financial aid 
package included $2,028 in job aid, rising slightly to $2,109 in 2000.  Over the same 
period, the base loan amount increased from $3,731 to $4,063, and the remaining grant 
component increased from a median of $11,865 to $14,842.
6   
   The new policy announced in January 1998 made NEU more attractive to low-
income students by giving them grants in place of the loans they would have received 
under the old regime.  Under the new policy, the loan component of these students￿ 
packages was completely eliminated and replaced with grants.  That is, a low-income 
student who would have been expected to borrow $4,000 per year was instead given an 
additional $4,000 in grants for 1998-1999.
7  The total amount of financial aid was not 
affected, only the composition. 
Clearly, an important aspect of the process is how the financial aid office 
classifies students as ￿low-income.￿  Before 1998, the financial aid office defined low-
income status based on expected parental contribution.
8  If the student’s parental 
contribution was less than $2,000, he or she would likely be classified as low-income.  
Low-income students were asked to take smaller loans than other students ￿ $500 to 
$2000 less for the poorest students in 1997, less than that in earlier years.  Under the new 
                                                 
6 The median is calculated among students receiving grant aid.   
7 NEU made other changes to its financial aid policy for the class of 2002.  For students whose family 
incomes are just above the low-income range, loans were reduced by smaller, graduated, amounts.  In 
addition, for low- and middle-income students, family assets were redefined to include only a portion of 
housing equity.  We ignore these changes in this paper.  However, low-income students tend to have fairly 
little housing equity and the family resources of students who benefit from the redefinition of housing 
equity are sufficiently high that they do not qualify as low-income even with the redefinition.  We 
anticipate that, if anything, our estimates are downward biased due to these other changes.  
8  The student￿s ability to pay is composed of two parts:  the expected parental contribution and the 
contribution from the student￿s own resources (e.g., from summer jobs and external scholarships).  7  
 
policy, students are classified as low-income if their family income is less than the 
national median family income ￿ $41,955 for the class entering in 1998.
9   
NEU officials estimate that this new program will cost approximately $1.7 million 
per year by the time it is fully phased-in, in fiscal year 2002.  The goal of this paper is to 
determine whether this expenditure has increased the yield (percent of admits enrolling) 
among low-income students, and if so, by how much. 
 
III.  Data and Econometric Model 
A. Data 
The data come from the administrative archives of NEU’s Financial Aid Office.  
The database contains detailed financial aid and admissions information on each year’s 
admitted students, including their financial position (family income, assets, and so on) 
and the composition of their financial aid packages.  We analyze data from the classes of 
1992 through 2004 (who entered in 1988 through 2000).  The data are proprietary and 
sensitive, as they contain detailed individual financial information on NEU’s 
undergraduates and alumni.  The archiving is done after the admissions process is 
complete but before the students actually begin classes.   
We begin with 25,958 records on individual students and drop 1,433 observations 
with missing or ambiguous information.
10  Additionally, because the program is 
particularly targeted at American students and because international students￿ financial 
indicators are relatively difficult to interpret, for most of the analysis we focus our 
                                                 
9 This figure is the median among families with children under age 18 in 1996, the latest year for which 
data were available when the cutoff was set in late 1997 for students entering NEU in the fall of 1998.  This 
is reported in nominal currency because the Financial Aid Office based its low-income classification on 
nominal dollars.  8  
 
attention on U.S. citizens, reducing the sample by an additional 2,465 records.  Another 
8,359 admitted students are excluded from the analysis because they applied for early 
decision or early action.
11  These students choose to commit to, or at least focus on, NEU 
before they receive financial aid offers.  Their enrollment decisions, therefore, are likely 
less sensitive to financial aid, and it is not appropriate to analyze them along with regular 
admission applicants.  More importantly, early decision application binds the student to 
attend if accepted, so there is no decision to make conditional on admission. 
 
B. Econometric  Model 
We have data only on students who were admitted, not on all who applied, so we 
focus on the probability of acceptance conditional on admission to NEU.  (In aggregate 
form this translates into the ￿yield rate,￿ defined as the percentage of admitted applicants 
who enroll.)  Hence, we cannot assess the impact of the change in financial aid policy on 
the pool of applicants from which the admissions office chooses.   
We model the individual student￿s decision to accept NEU￿s admissions offer as a 
conventional probit model: 
 
                                E it  = F[α  + Ptβ 1 + LIit β 2 + (Pt * LI it) β 3 + X it γ  ]                          (1) 
 
where Eit is the probability that student i chooses to enroll at NEU in year t, F[  ] is the 
cumulative normal distribution, Xit is a vector of student characteristics (described in the 
next section), Pt is a binary variable that equals 1 if the student applied after the 1998 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 In most of these cases, there was a problem in the coding of the student￿s enrollment decision.  9  
 
change in financial aid (i.e., it equals one for all students in the classes of 2002, 2003, and 
2004), LIit is a binary variable that equals 1 if the student is classified as low-income, and 
β 1, β 2, β 3, γ  and α  are parameters to be estimated.  To allow comparisons between low-
income students before and after the policy change, we reclassify students from all 
classes as low-income according to the definition adopted by the Financial Aid Office at 
the time of the policy change.  That is, we classify students as low-income if their family 
income is below the national median for families with children under 18 in the year 
before their application. 
The coefficient β 1 reflects the change in the probability that students in the classes 
of 2002, 2003, and 2004 (those that applied after the change in financial aid) enrolled at 
NEU relative to those who applied earlier.  As such, it measures the impact of all aspects 
of the post-program environment that might have affected the probability of accepting an 
offer of admission.  The coefficient β 2 reflects the difference in probability of enrolling at 
NEU between students who are classified as low-income and those who are not, for all 
classes.  As a result, the coefficient β 3 on the interaction between Pt and LIit reflects the 
incremental effect on the probability of accepting admission at NEU for low-income 
students after the change in financial aid took effect.  It is, therefore, our coefficient of 
interest -- the differences-in-differences estimator for this program.  The identifying 
assumption is that the change in financial aid policy did not affect the enrollment rates of 
non-low-income students. 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 NEU switched from a non-binding ￿early action￿ policy to a binding ￿early decision￿ policy beginning 
with the class of 2000.  10  
 
The specification in equation (1) implicitly assumes that the effect of the new 
program was the same for each class.  We also estimate an alternative specification in 
which we allow the effect of the program to vary by class:   
 
                             E it = F[α · + Ctβ 1t + LIitβ 2·+ (Ct*LI it) β 3t + X it γ ·]                              (2) 
 
where Ct is a set of binary variables that take a value of one if a student is in a particular 
class, and zero otherwise (the omitted class is 1992), and Ct * LI it is a set of interactions 
between the class effects and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the student is 
low-income, and the other notation is as defined above.  Each of these interactions shows, 
for the respective class, the difference in the probability of acceptance between low-
income students in that class and the other students, ceteris paribus.  This specification 
contains no single regression coefficient that summarizes the effect of the program.  We 
therefore estimate the effect of the program by computing the average of the coefficients 
of the interaction terms (β 3t) during the program period (i.e., for the classes of 2002, 
2003, and 2004), and compare it to the average for the classes in the years before the 
program.
12  The difference between the averages is the net program effect.   
 
IV. Results 
A.   Descriptive  Statistics 
Table 1 exhibits mean student characteristics over the entire sample period.   
These statistics apply to admitted U.S. citizens who applied regular decision, not early 
                                                 
12 Weighting this average by sample sizes in each year has no substantial effect on the results.  11  
 
action or early decision.  We present means broken down by income status, financial aid 
status, sex, census division of residence, ethnicity, whether the student is a recruited 
athlete, and the student￿s academic and non-academic ratings by the admissions office.  
The ratings were assigned by the Office of Admissions during the admissions process.  
The academic rating was based on factors such as high school grades, SAT scores, prior 
experience with graduates of the same high school, and teacher recommendations.  An 
academic rating of A was given to students who are best-prepared academically (e.g., 
with high grades and high SAT scores); an academic rating of E was given to the least 
prepared students.  The non-academic rating was determined by a variety of attributes 
such as leadership, athletic or musical ability, and volunteer work.  The non-academic 
ratings also ranged from A to E.  We break down the various student characteristics by 
whether the student was low-income (again retroactively applying the post-change 
definition) and by whether the student enrolled. 
Ninety-eight percent of the admitted low-income students in our analysis sample 
were awarded financial aid,
13 compared to only 47 percent of non-low-income students.  
Further, relative to high-income students, low-income students had on average lower 
admissions ratings (both academic and non-academic), were less likely to be athletes and 
alumni children, and were more likely to be minorities.  (Throughout our analysis, we 
classify students as minority if they identify themselves as African-American, Hispanic, 
or Native American.  We do not classify Asian students as minority.)  The fraction of 
minority students in our sample is quite high, reaching nearly one-third by the end of the 
analysis period.  This is higher than the overall fraction of minority students at NEU, as 
                                                 









Low-income 0.101 0.000 1.000 0.109 0.000 1.000
Financial Aid Recipient 0.487 0.432 0.983 0.515 0.457 0.989
Financial Aid Applicant 0.618 0.576 1.000 0.642 0.598 1.000
Female 0.470 0.470 0.473 0.448 0.448 0.454
Census Division:
New England 0.054 0.055 0.042 0.050 0.051 0.038
Middle Atlantic 0.320 0.325 0.278 0.358 0.362 0.328
East North Central 0.101 0.104 0.067 0.095 0.099 0.059
West North Central 0.034 0.034 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.032
South Atlantic 0.113 0.112 0.117 0.113 0.114 0.109
East South Central 0.062 0.062 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.066
West South Central 0.068 0.064 0.111 0.070 0.065 0.109
Mountain 0.034 0.032 0.048 0.030 0.028 0.047
Pacific 0.172 0.171 0.175 0.140 0.140 0.141
Academic Rating:
A 0.266 0.279 0.143 0.176 0.184 0.109
B 0.355 0.366 0.256 0.354 0.369 0.235
C 0.222 0.210 0.337 0.254 0.246 0.323
D 0.126 0.114 0.233 0.171 0.157 0.284
E 0.022 0.021 0.030 0.038 0.037 0.047
Non Academic Rating:
A 0.022 0.023 0.012 0.023 0.024 0.013
B 0.215 0.222 0.157 0.246 0.254 0.186
C 0.433 0.439 0.376 0.436 0.441 0.391
D 0.301 0.288 0.413 0.271 0.260 0.366
E 0.020 0.017 0.041 0.017 0.014 0.042
Admissions Ratings Missing 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.003
Athlete 0.153 0.157 0.117 0.228 0.236 0.169
Alumni child 0.065 0.071 0.017 0.091 0.100 0.015
African-American 0.146 0.129 0.297 0.118 0.100 0.263
Latino 0.033 0.028 0.079 0.035 0.029 0.082
Mexican 0.057 0.046 0.162 0.049 0.039 0.130
Other Hispanic 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.011 0.010 0.018
Native American 0.010 0.008 0.021 0.011 0.008 0.029
Asian 0.152 0.158 0.101 0.121 0.125 0.087
Number of Observations 13701 12322 1379 6558 5842 716
Table 1: 
Means of Student Characteristics
Admitted Enrolled
Regular Admission U.S. Citizens in the Graduating Classes of 1992-2004 12  
 
minority students were relatively more likely to apply regular decision, and hence to be 
included in our analysis sample. 
Table 2 contains time series data on key characteristics of NEU students in our 
analysis sample.  Since the early 1990s, the percentage of admitted students who were 
low-income has ranged from about 7 to 14 percent; the percentage of enrolled students 
who were low-income has ranged from 8 to 12 percent.
14  The percentage of these 
students who receive financial aid has been in the 50 to 60 percent range.  Over time, the 
percentages of females and minorities have increased.  Both the academic and 
nonacademic ratings of the classes have improved.
15  Further, smaller proportions of the 
class have been recruited athletes and children of alumni. 
Aggregate yield rate data from the classes of 1992 through 2004 are summarized 
in Table 3.  The first column indicates that yield rates at NEU have been increasing over 
time, starting at about 55 percent in the early 1990s and ending at 72 percent for the class 
of 2004.  As noted in Section III, we focus on students who go through the regular 
admission process.  Since early decision students are committed to enroll, and early 
action students were very likely to do so, the yield rates for students admitted under 
regular admission are lower than those for all admitted students, and although they have 
also been increasing, the trend has been at a substantially slower rate (from 48 percent at 
the beginning of the period to 53 percent at the end). 
The next two columns show the yield rates by income status, again imposing the 
1998 definition of ￿low-income￿ on all classes.  For convenience, these rates are graphed 
in the upper panel of Figure 1.  At the beginning of the period, the yield rate for low-
                                                 
14 These calculations use the national-median based low-income definition to all classes, retroactively for 

























1992 0.096 0.449 0.571 0.395 0.200 0.552 0.508 0.173 0.863 $77,111 $11,037 $28,013
1993 0.117 0.480 0.603 0.439 0.229 0.518 0.198 0.188 0.777 $76,330 $12,262 $28,448
1994 0.109 0.470 0.595 0.454 0.233 0.592 0.174 0.174 0.599 $79,229 $12,421 $28,951
1995 0.088 0.473 0.612 0.453 0.247 0.568 0.176 0.181 0.756 $79,049 $12,575 $29,414
1996 0.100 0.492 0.598 0.486 0.246 0.527 0.178 0.182 0.553 $78,404 $14,397 $30,275
1997 0.098 0.486 0.615 0.462 0.280 0.612 0.201 0.157 0.504 $85,151 $13,768 $31,023
1998 0.107 0.505 0.609 0.494 0.283 0.593 0.210 0.161 0.582 $84,543 $16,920 $31,715
1999 0.094 0.522 0.643 0.493 0.282 0.616 0.195 0.163 0.049 $79,297 $18,651 $32,245
2000 0.107 0.506 0.641 0.483 0.259 0.694 0.206 0.124 0.663 $82,554 $16,623 $32,712
2001 0.083 0.479 0.654 0.480 0.253 0.690 0.247 0.123 0.599 $91,620 $16,234 $33,143
2002 0.096 0.534 0.656 0.510 0.284 0.722 0.233 0.111 0.062 $88,947 $19,479 $33,874
2003 0.110 0.479 0.656 0.498 0.277 0.774 0.243 0.110 0.694 $94,531 $16,750 $34,262
2004 0.098 0.478 0.627 0.519 0.314 0.735 0.277 0.094 0.707 $92,018 $18,372 $34,371
Enrolled students
1992 0.102 0.454 0.570 0.395 0.162 0.465 0.511 0.249 0.117 $73,270 $13,701 $28,013
1993 0.122 0.481 0.593 0.431 0.185 0.386 0.202 0.273 0.132 $73,420 $13,970 $28,448
1994 0.134 0.520 0.644 0.420 0.225 0.483 0.195 0.259 0.864 $77,548 $14,676 $28,951
1995 0.070 0.493 0.628 0.415 0.189 0.439 0.215 0.280 0.122 $80,959 $14,232 $29,414
1996 0.105 0.547 0.649 0.440 0.200 0.425 0.211 0.275 0.915 $72,731 $16,857 $30,275
1997 0.113 0.547 0.670 0.414 0.234 0.496 0.254 0.262 0.820 $82,374 $15,980 $31,023
1998 0.113 0.551 0.632 0.472 0.247 0.490 0.253 0.251 0.688 $80,587 $18,355 $31,715
1999 0.101 0.575 0.695 0.478 0.268 0.518 0.223 0.243 0.660 $78,200 $19,210 $32,245
2000 0.127 0.532 0.667 0.478 0.236 0.604 0.230 0.187 0.760 $79,516 $17,779 $32,712
2001 0.079 0.484 0.662 0.445 0.211 0.630 0.284 0.184 0.086 $89,644 $16,569 $33,143
2002 0.095 0.556 0.673 0.496 0.250 0.649 0.264 0.163 0.706 $88,623 $20,136 $33,874
2003 0.144 0.499 0.672 0.457 0.247 0.698 0.300 0.171 0.788 $86,343 $19,286 $34,262
2004 0.108 0.476 0.616 0.517 0.271 0.679 0.318 0.144 0.926 $89,611 $19,587 $34,371
2
  Among financial aid recipients.
Notes:  Only includes non-early admission U.S. citizens.  Minority students include those who self-report as African-American, Hispanic, or Native 
American.  All dollar amounts are in 1999 dollars.  The cost of attendance is the sum of tuition, fees, room and board, and estimated additional expenses.  
Whether or not a student is categorized as "low-income" is defined retroactively according to the post-2002 definition (see text).
Table 2: 
Time Series of Student Characteristics
Proportion A or B
1
1
 "A" is the highest admissions rating; "B" is the second highest (see text).  Non-academic rating is 1992 is coded differently and is not comparable.









1992 54.59% 47.30% 47.01% 50.00% 34.29% 53.57%
1993 54.81% 46.75% 46.50% 48.65% 37.44% 38.46%
1994 55.93% 46.53% 45.26% 56.83% 40.19% 58.02%
1995 55.93% 42.91% 43.76% 34.04% 35.61% 23.33%
1996 56.34% 43.02% 42.81% 44.86% 33.50% 39.68%
1997 57.82% 43.88% 43.17% 50.46% 35.48% 41.27%
1998 58.98% 45.66% 45.34% 48.28% 39.48% 41.10%
1999 62.96% 48.55% 48.18% 52.13% 46.05% 46.30%
2000 68.80% 51.26% 50.12% 60.78% 44.81% 52.38%
2001 68.13% 50.32% 50.52% 48.10% 41.03% 45.65%
2002 71.86% 54.69% 54.76% 54.02% 46.41% 55.10%
2003 70.95% 52.89% 50.85% 69.46% 40.54% 70.37%
2004 72.52% 53.12% 52.53% 58.54% 44.23% 51.85%
Average 61.50% 47.87% 47.41% 51.92% 39.87% 47.10%
Number of Observations 24805 13701 12322 1379 2729 794
Minority students include those who self-report as African-American, Hispanic, or Native American.
Regular admission US citizens
All Minority
Table 3: 
Yield Rates at NEU for the Graduating Classes of 1992-2004 13  
 
income students was below that for students who were not, but by the end of the sample 
period, the situation was reversed.  Enrollments of African-American, Hispanic, and 
Native American (￿minority￿) students have been a matter of special concern at NEU and 
a number of other institutions, so in the last two columns (and the lower panel of Figure 
1) we show yield rates among minorities.  
Figure 1 suggests that the difference in yield rates between low-income and not-
low-income students has widened since the change in the financial aid program, 
suggesting that the change in financial aid composition had a sizeable impact on the 
matriculation of low-income students.  However, the figure also highlights some 
difficulties with this conclusion.  First, note that the yield rates for classes in the early 
1990s were quite a bit lower than those for the last three classes, the ￿treatment￿ group.  
Hence, if we visually compare the last three classes with their predecessors as a group, it 
appears that the yield rates increased during the program period.  On the other hand, 
suppose that we choose to make the ￿comparison￿ group only the four classes before the 
program was introduced.  In this case, the answer from visual inspection is no longer 
quite so clear.   
In the same way, we cannot know whether the unusually low yield among low-
income students for the class of 2001 reflected a permanent change in the yield rates that 
would have continued had NEU not changed its financial aid policy, or whether it was a 
transitory change.  If the yield for the class of 2001 reflected a permanent change, then it 
makes sense to use it as a base from which to evaluate the financial aid program.  In 
contrast, if the yield for the class of 2001 reflected a transitory change, then its inclusion 
in the analysis will artificially inflate the estimated impact of the program.  
                                                                                                                                                 
15 The nonacademic ratings for the class of 1992 are on a different scale than other classes.  14  
 
One possibility is that the patterns in Figure 1 are driven by changes in student 
characteristics over time.  To investigate this issue, in Figure 2 we show the time series in 
yield rates adjusted for student characteristics.  (The adjustments are based on a probit 
regression that controlled for race, gender, total size of financial aid award, alumni child, 
region of permanent residence, recruited athlete, and both academic and nonacademic 
rankings for admission.)  While the regression-adjusted variation in yield rates is 
somewhat smaller than the unadjusted, the patterns do not change enough to resolve the 
ambiguities just discussed.  In short, the time series pattern of yield rates raises the 
possibility that our substantive results may be sensitive to the choice of comparison 
classes.  Our statistical analysis explicitly takes this possibility into account. 
Another concern is that the yield rates among different income groups may have 
moved differently over time for reasons that have nothing to do with the financial aid 
practices of NEU.  Of course, we cannot know what would have happened at NEU if it 
had not changed its policy.  However, we can compare the time series on yield rates at 
NEU to the pattern at several similar universities in the Northeast.  We were not able to 
obtain data on other schools￿ yield rates by students￿ incomes.  However, the Consortium 
on Financing Higher Education (COFHE) provided us with data on overall yield rates 
and yield rates among minorities at a group of similar universities.
16  The yield rate data 
for these schools are summarized in Figure 3.  Note that the yield data for NEU in this 
figure differ from those in previous figures.  In order to make the two panels of Figure 3 
fully comparable, we use the COFHE data for NEU as well, thus re-introducing the early 
admissions and international students to the sample. 
                                                 
16 For consistency we have again excluded Asians from our definition of minority.  15  
 
Figure 3 suggests that NEU￿s peer institutions did not experience the dip in the 
yield rate that occurred in NEU￿s class of 2001.  This might suggest that the dip at NEU 
was, in fact, transitory, for if more fundamental forces were at work, NEU’s peer 
institutions would likely have experienced a similar phenomenon.  In addition, Figure 3 
reveals that yields for the peer institutions did not change much after the class of 2002.  
In contrast, NEU￿s minority yields increased by 11% in the post-program period.  This is 
consistent with the notion that any change we find at NEU is plausibly attributable to the 
specific financial aid policy changes instituted there. 
 
B. Multivariate  Analysis 
 1.  Overall  Results 
  Column (1) of Table 4 shows the results from equation (1) without individual 
covariates (Xit).  The coefficient on the program variable indicates that during the period 
it has been in effect, the yield rate for non-low-income students was 3.6 percentage points 
higher than previously, an increase that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
Further, the coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the probability of a low-
income student accepting the offer was 4.7 percentage points higher than that, although 
the difference is not statistically significant.  Hence, in this basic model, we cannot detect 
a statistically discernible effect of the program on the yield of low-income students. 
  As shown in Table 2, the composition of the admitted students changed 
substantially during the program period.  Thus, in column (2) of Table 4 we control for a 
variety of individual characteristics.  All of the variables are dichotomous and familiar 
from Table 1 except for the student￿s financial aid award, which reflects the value (in No Controls
Add Student 
Characteristics




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low-income 0.036 -0.038 -0.052 0.004
(0.016) (0.019) (0.057) (0.040)
Program 0.066 0.168
(0.011) (0.013)
Program * Low-income 0.047 0.020
(0.036) (0.038)
Net program effect 0.023 0.010
(0.039) (0.028)
Financial Aid Award/10
3 (1999$) 0.006 0.005 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Female -0.026 -0.029 -0.024
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Alumni Child 0.155 0.150 0.146
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014)
Academic Rating:
A -0.644 -0.698 -0.600
(0.040) (0.041) (0.032)
B -0.423 -0.454 -0.416
(0.039) (0.040) (0.031)
C -0.265 -0.289 -0.266
(0.038) (0.039) (0.030)
D -0.152 -0.166 -0.145
(0.039) (0.039) (0.031)
Non-academic Rating:
A -0.206 -0.218 -0.225
(0.045) (0.046) (0.032)
B -0.057 -0.060 -0.072
  -(0.006) (0.035) (0.024)
C -0.006 -0.007 -0.022
(0.032) (0.033) (0.023)
D 0.006 0.008 -0.010
(0.033) (0.033) (0.023)
Admissions Ratings Missing -0.565 -0.563 -0.581
(0.068) (0.069) (0.046)
Recruited Athlete 0.084 0.078 0.038
Table 4: 
Probit Analysis of Enrollment Decision at NEU
Regular Admission U.S. Citizens(0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
African-American -0.370 -0.385 -0.339
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013)
Latino -0.263 -0.276 -0.226
(0.028) -(0.276) (0.023)
Mexican -0.300 -0.314 -0.270
(0.023) (0.024) (0.019)
Other Hispanic -0.097 -0.099 -0.107
(0.043) (0.043) (0.029)
Native American -0.145 -0.161 -0.174
(0.047) (0.047) (0.040)



















































Applied early action/decision 0.425
(0.008)
Early decision year 0.135
(0.019)
Census Division dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -9457.319 -8444.490 -8376.591 -13023.924
Number of Observations 13701 13701 13701 24805
Base Probability 0.479 0.479 0.479 0.615
Class of 2000 effect is omitted in column (4) because of colinearity with program and early decision year
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Coefficients reported are marginal effects.  
The base probability is the predicted probability of enrollment evaluated at the mean student characteristics.
The net program effect in columns (3) and (4) is calculated as the average of the class * low-income interactions 
after the policy change (2002-2004) minus the average of the interactions before the policy change. student  16  
 
1999 dollars) of the student￿s total financial aid from all sources.  Controlling for the size 
of the package allows us to focus on the effect of the composition of the package.
17  
Women were 2.7 percentage points less likely to accept an offer than men; alumni 
children were 15 percentage points more likely than their non-alumni counterparts to do 
so.  As both academic and nonacademic ratings increased, the probability of accepting an 
offer fell.  Recruited athletes were about 26 percentage points more likely to accept an 
admissions offer; minority students were less likely to accept an offer than were non-
minorities.
18  The difference-in-differences estimate of the program effect, β 3  from 
equation (1), is smaller when the covariates are taken into account, 0.024 versus 0.047 
from column (1), and is still not statistically different from zero.   
As noted above, the specification in equation (1) implicitly assumes that the effect 
of the new program was exactly the same for each class.  In column (3) of Table 4 we 
allow the effect for low-income students to vary by class as described in equation (2).  
The second figure in the column, the net program effect, is 0.028 with a standard error of 
0.039.  This is essentially the same as the estimate of the program effect from column (2).  
Hence, allowing for separate class effects has little impact on our assessment of the 
impact of the program.  We also note that the coefficients on the other covariates are 
barely affected. 
Beginning with the class of 2000, two years before the financial aid policy 
change, NEU switched from a non-binding early action program to a binding early-
decision program.  If this change affected the composition of the regular-decision body of 
                                                 
17 If we use expected family contribution to control for family financial resources, we obtain substantially 
similar results. 
18  We have also estimated specifications in which we interact academic rating with other characteristics 
(such as race, whether athlete or child of alumni) with substantively similar results.  17  
 
students, one might be concerned that the exclusion of early admission students from our 
analysis biases our results.  In column (4) of Table 4 we reintroduce the early applicants 
from all classes into our analysis and add controls for whether the student applied early 
action/decision and whether the university followed an early action or early decision 
policy in that year.  The coefficient of interest becomes somewhat smaller, and remains 
insignificantly different from zero (as well as insignificantly different from the previous 
estimate).  The estimated program effect falls because the indicator for early decision 
years (the classes of 2000-2004) captures some of the recent rise in yields.  We conclude 
that the change in early admission policy does not significantly affect our results. 
 
 2.  Alternative  Comparison  Classes 
  The models of Table 4 are estimated using the data for every class available to us.  
However, as noted above, including all previous classes in the comparison group may be 
inappropriate.  In particular, the decision-making process of students admitted in the early 
years of our sample might have been quite different from those of the students admitted 
since 1998, perhaps because of differences in unobservable characteristics.  An additional 
concern mentioned earlier is that the yield rate among low-income students in the year 
just prior to the adoption of the program may have been transitorily low.  
Because we have no compelling a priori reasons to view some years as more 
suitable for inclusion in the comparison group than others, we estimate the model with 
several different comparison groups.  Table 5 shows the outcomes when we exclude the 
class of 2001 (column (1)), the classes of 2000 and 2001 (column (2)), all classes before 
1997 (column (3)), and all classes before 1997 as well as 2000 and 2001 (column (4)). 2001 2000 and 2001




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low-income -0.034 -0.036 -0.035 -0.037
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.034)
Program 0.180 0.194 0.129 0.167
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Program * Low-income 0.011 0.012 0.034 0.024
(0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.046)
Financial Aid Award/10
3 (1999$) 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.025 -0.029 -0.026 -0.027
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
Alumni Child 0.149 0.158 0.112 0.110
(0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.030)
Academic Rating:
A -0.657 -0.661 -0.730 -0.705
(0.041) (0.042) (0.075) (0.080)
B -0.427 -0.426 -0.492 -0.465
(0.040) (0.040) (0.074) (0.078)
C -0.263 -0.262 -0.334 -0.303
(0.039) (0.039) (0.073) (0.078)
D -0.148 -0.145 -0.229 -0.193
(0.039) (0.040) (0.074) (0.078)
Non-academic Rating:
A -0.226 -0.232 -0.204 -0.244
(0.047) (0.049) (0.060) (0.070)
B -0.066 -0.072 -0.038 -0.061
  (0.035) (0.037) (0.046) (0.053)
C -0.015 -0.024 0.001 -0.031
(0.034) (0.035) (0.044) (0.051)
D -0.001 -0.014 0.010 -0.028
(0.034) (0.036) (0.044) (0.051)
Admissions Ratings Missing -0.567 -0.562 -0.697 -0.659
(0.069) (0.070) (0.189) (0.192)
Recruited Athlete 0.082 0.080 0.101 0.105
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028)
African-American -0.375 -0.373 -0.379 -0.374
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.026)
Latino -0.276 -0.278 -0.262 -0.279
(0.029) (0.031) (0.038) (0.044)
Table 5: 
Alternative Specifications
Sample Excludes the Specified Graduation Classes  Mexican -0.309 -0.314 -0.323 -0.340
(0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.035)
Other Hispanic -0.117 -0.125 -0.067 -0.098
(0.044) (0.045) (0.051) (0.056)
Native American -0.156 -0.159 -0.174 -0.188
(0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.063)
Asian -0.050 -0.054 -0.040 -0.045
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020)
Census Division Dummies Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12749 11799 7700 5798
Log Likelihood -7825.920 -7214.539 -4754.616 -3549.307
Base Probability 0.477 0.474 0.502 0.497
Includes only regular admission U.S. citizens
Notes:  See notes to Table 4. 18  
 
As before, we focus on the coefficient on the interaction of the program and low-
income dichotomous variables.  The overall results are remarkably insensitive to the 
choice of years to include.  The point estimates of the program effect range from 1.5 to 
3.8 percentage points, in the same ballpark as those in Table 4, and also are not 
statistically significant.  In short, the finding that the program has no significant effect is 
robust to alternative specifications of the comparison group. 
 
3.  Effects by Race and Ethnicity 
  Much of the discussion of financial aid packages for low-income students has 
focused on recruiting minorities.  In this context, an important question is whether 
minorities are similar to the sample as a whole with respect to their responsiveness to 
changes in financial aid packages.  Thus, we estimate the basic models from Table 4 with 
the sample restricted to minority students.  This analysis compares the change in yield 
among low-income minorities to the change in yield among non-low-income minorities ￿ 
we look for an effect of the program by low-income status within the minority 
population, not for an effect of the program on minorities as a group.
19   
  The results are presented in Table 6.  The key finding is that the program effect 
was between 8 and 9 percentage points, and that this effect is significant at about the 10 
percent level.  This is a large effect relative to the base yield of 40 percent for minorities 
before the class of 2002.  In the specification that does not control for ethnic differences 
within the minority sample, the significance level is 0.079; when we include dichotomous 
                                                 
19  Twenty-three percent of minority students were low-income, higher than the 10 percent of the overall 
sample, but still a relatively small fraction.  As a result, the program did not have any significant effect on 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low-income 0.051 -0.084 -0.092 -0.145 -0.101
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.076) (0.071)
Program 0.054 0.116 0.118
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Program * Low-income 0.098 0.089 0.082
(0.049) (0.051) (0.051)
Net program effect 0.081 0.100
(0.052) (0.049)
Financial Aid Award/10
3 (1999$) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Alumni Child 0.157 0.155 0.149 0.126
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.065)
Academic Rating:
A -0.533 -0.601 -0.674 -0.644
(0.081) (0.082) (0.084) (0.076)
B -0.474 -0.500 -0.574 -0.587
(0.070) (0.071) (0.073) (0.066)
C -0.359 -0.364 -0.434 -0.455
(0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.065)
D -0.199 -0.197 -0.243 -0.258
(0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.064)
Non-academic Rating:
A -0.177 -0.218 -0.226 -0.168
(0.119) (0.122) (0.124) (0.103)
B -0.076 -0.076 -0.093 -0.078
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.050)
C -0.041 -0.036 -0.046 -0.043
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.043)
D -0.029 -0.017 -0.016 -0.024
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.042)
Admissions Ratings Missing -0.050 -0.029 -0.077 -0.718
(0.304) (0.308) (0.307) (0.136)
Recruited Athlete 0.199 0.189 0.183 0.130
Regular Admission U.S. Citizens
Table 6: 
Probit Analysis of Enrollment Decision at NEU among Minorities(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.045)
Latino 0.117 0.120 0.115
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Mexican 0.063 0.068 0.070
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Other Hispanic 0.243 0.258 0.211
(0.046) (0.046) (0.037)



















































Applied early action/decision 0.525
(0.029)
Early decision year 0.113
(0.047)
Census Division dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -2375.878 -2205.500 -2180.132 -2148.199 -2585.493
Number of Observations 3523 3523 3523 3523 4442
Base Probability 0.415 0.409 0.407 0.406 0.460
The omitted race category is African-American.
The base probability is the predicted probability of enrollment evaluated at the mean student characteristics.
Class of 2000 effect is omitted in column (5) because of colinearity with program and early decision year
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Coefficients reported are marginal effects.
The net program effect in columns (4) and (5) is calculated as the average of the class * low-income interactions 
after the policy change (2002-2004) minus the average of the interactions before the policy change. 19  
 
variables for Hispanic and Native American origins, the significance level is 0.106.   
Including the early admissions students, as in column (4) of Table 4, the significance 
level improves to better than 5%. 
We conclude that, on average, the program had a larger impact on low-income 
minorities -- the point estimate is about twice that for the entire sample, while its standard 
error is not much larger.
20  This is consistent with Jackson [1990], who, using an 
approach rather different from ours, found that in the decision to attend a college African-
Americans respond positively to grants but not significantly to loans, and that African-
Americans are about twice as responsive to grants as whites.
21 
  
4.   Discussion 
Why didn￿t NEU￿s change from loans to grants have a statistically discernable 
impact on the overall yield rate among low-income applicants?  One possibility is that 
admitted students were not fully aware of the program.  However, the program did have a 
significant (at the 10 percent level) effect among minorities, and we have no reason to 
believe that minorities were better informed about the program.  Additionally, even if 
students were not aware of the program when they decided to apply, they usually 
received financial aid details at the same time as the admission offer, so they should have 
known how the program affected them at the time they made their enrollment decisions. 
                                                 
20 Along the lines of Table 5, we checked the robustness of this finding to the inclusion of various classes.  
The effect is not very sensitive to these changes.  To the extent there is a change, the impact becomes larger 
when we exclude the earlier classes. 
21 There are substantial differences between Jackson￿s study and our own.  His estimates are based on a 
sample of applicants to all colleges (High School and Beyond) as opposed to applicants to a single college.  
Further, Jackson models the probability of attending college as a function of the presence of loans or grants 
as opposed to examining a change in regime from loans to grants.  Also, Jackson estimates separate effects 
for blacks and Hispanics.  We do not attempt to estimate separate effects because the number of Hispanics  20  
 
Second, the change in financial aid (loan replacements of approximately $4,000 
per year) was fairly small relative to the average financial aid package of low-income 
students ￿ $25,734, of which an average of about $20,000 would have been grants in the 
absence of the loan-replacement program (the remainder being jobs).  It may be that this 
incremental change was too small to have had a detectable effect on enrollment decisions.   
A third, closely related possibility is that the underlying elasticity may be small, 
so the effect of a program this size was not big enough to be estimated precisely given the 
inherent noisiness of the process.  In this context, it is useful to compare our results to 
those of Dynarski [1999, 2000], who, as noted in the introduction, uses two different 
datasets to estimate the elasticity of college enrollment to financial aid awards.  First, 
studying the Georgia Hope Scholarship she estimates that $1,000 in aid increased the 
enrollment rate at Georgia colleges by 3.7 to 4.2 percentage points.  Second, studying the 
end of the Social Security Student Benefits program she estimates an elasticity for 
enrollment with respect to aid amount between 0.7 and 0.8.  While these estimates are for 
enrollment at any college and for increases in total aid rather than shifts in the 
composition of the package, they do provide a base of comparison for our point 
estimates. 
Table 7, below, shows the predicted effect of NEU￿s financial aid policy change 
using Dynarski￿s estimates of the behavioral parameters.  The perceived equivalent 
increase in total aid corresponding to a shift from loans to grants is hard to calculate, so 
we report a range of values: loans valued at one-half, one-third, and one-quarter of the 
face value.  For example, consider the implications of Dynarski￿s estimated elasticity of 
                                                                                                                                                 
is low.  However, the estimates computed using only the sample of African-Americans are not substantially 
different from those that include Hispanics and Native Americans as well.  21  
 
0.75 assuming (a) NEU￿s base yield among pre-program low-income admits is 50%, (b) 
the pre-program base grant is $20,000, and (c) the $4,000 shift from loans to grants is 
valued by students at $2,000 (on the high side of the previous literature).  In this case, the 
predicted effect on yield rates is an increase of 3.75 percentage points.
22  Our estimated 
effect implied by Table 4, column (3), is 2.3 percentage points with a standard error of 
3.8 percentage points.  Therefore, the predicted impact based on Dynarski￿s elasticity is 
not significantly different from our estimate.  Neither, however, is it significantly 
different from zero.  The calculations reported in the other cells in the table yield 
qualitatively similar results.   
 
Table 7 
Predicted Effect of NEU’s Policy Change Using Dynarski’s Estimated Effects 
of Financial Aid on College Attendance 
 
Predicted Percentage Point Change in NEU￿s Yield Rate  Relative loan 
value  Georgia Hope Scholarship 
3.7 to 4.2 percentage points per $1,000 
Social Security Student Benefits 
[elasticity = 0.075] 
0.50  7.4 to 8.4  3.7 
0.33  4.9 to 5.6  2.5 
0.25  3.7 to 4.2  1.9 
 
In short, while it is possible that NEU￿s program had no effect on overall matriculation, 
we cannot reject the possibility that it had an impact similar to that found in previous 
analyses of enrollment decisions.   
  A question remains, however, why the program appears to have had a larger 
effect on the matriculation of minority applicants.  One possibility is that the result is 
attributable to economic resource differences, since family financial status is so highly 
                                                 
22 The calculation is as follows.  By definition, the elasticity is (∆Yield / Yield0) * (Aid0 / ∆aid).  
Substituting into this expression, 0.75 = (∆Yield / 0.5) * ($20,000 / $2,000).  Solving, ∆Yield = 0.0375.    22  
 
correlated with race and ethnicity.  For three reasons, however, we do not believe that 
family resources are the primary explanation for the differences by minority status.  First, 
our model controls for the total size of the financial aid package, which, as observed 
above, is a one-dimensional index of a family￿s overall financial position.  Second, the 
minorities affected by the loan-replacement program are not actually much poorer than 
the whites so affected.  Among low-income minority admits, the mean family income is 
$24,177, only ten percent less than the mean among low-income whites of $26,836.   
Plotting the income density (not shown) reveals that the distributions are similar as well.   
Third, recall that the basis of our estimates is a difference-in-differences 
comparison between non-low-income and low-income students, within racial/ethnic 
groups.  Further, the mean income for minorities was $75,929 and $100,822 for whites, 
among those financial aid applicants who reported family income.  Thus, the difference 
in average incomes between low-income and non-low-income whites is greater than the 
corresponding figure for minorities.  If anything, this would tend to bias our estimates 
towards finding a smaller effect among minorities.   
Finally, although we have no direct evidence, the result is consistent with 
differing perceptions between minorities and nonminorities about the cost of financing 
college through loans.  Such differences may be due to greater uncertainty among 
minorities about the future returns to college education, and hence ability to repay loans. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We examine a program instituted at a Northeastern university to replace loans 
with grant aid for low-income students.  We find the program increased the likelihood of  23  
 
matriculation by low-income students by about 3 percentage points, although the effect is 
not statistically significant.  The effect among low-income minority students was about 
twice that size and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  While it is perilous to 
generalize on the basis of the experience of a single institution, an important lesson 
emerges from our analysis: within the population of low-income students, program 
effects may vary with race and ethnicity.  This possibility should be taken into account in 
the design and analysis of such programs.  24  
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